Pay Up OK?

In the wake of the great global recession there has been a “bad debt” explosion in China. It is estimated that the number of debts owed to Chinese exporters by US companies has increased 80% over the last two years. It is estimated that 5%-10% of all of purchase orders placed with Chinese manufacturers end up as unpaid bills/bad debt. Furthermore the China Chamber of International Commerce estimates outstanding debt owed to Chinese exporters at $150 billion with an annual increase of $15 billion. At most, only 5% of this debt is currently being recovered.

So why does so much of this debt get written off, uncollected and forgotten about in China? Why are so many US and European companies getting away with not paying what they owe, with no effect on their credit rating?  Chinese companies tend to keep pushing bad debt off sometimes as long as two or three years, hoping for payment, by which time it is all but unrecoverable. Chinese companies accustomed to doing business by Guanxi (relationships) negotiate with their debtors in person, usually yielding some result, but this does not work internationally.

Collections is a new element of business for many Chinese companies.  Some Chinese companies fear losing “face” if others find out they were not paid. Big State Owned Enterprises tend to push bad debt under the rug because they can, and because no one wants their career ruined by “bad debt” – it’s easier to put it off as “still outstanding”.

Many Chinese exporters do business based on credit, but do not have credit check and ratings regimes in place to make informed decisions. Chinese companies think that debt collection is a racket and that if they hand over their case to a debt collector the collector will keep the money.

Pan Asian Commercial Consulting Group, a US based corporate debt recovery firm and a new client of ours, has entered China to try and change all of this. They believe that there is a great business opportunity but also believe there is an ethical and moral component to helping these Chinese companies.

They are offering a straightforward approach. They have agents and lawyers in all 50 states (because statutes and laws vary by state). Once they receive a file from a Chinese company they will send the appropriate documentation and letters to the debtor company. If this fails the legal process begins. Once the debt is collected, Pan Asian earns its commission and the Chinese company recovers part or all of its money.

It will be interesting to see how this industry develops in China as more and more Chinese companies assert their rights and gain a better understanding. Do you have any experiences in this arena? Positive, negative? Opinions on the business as a whole in China? What are your thoughts?

So when our research manager, Frank Tsai, came to me and said that he could see some value in a review of the week’s news on China, I admit that I was a bit skeptical. It seemed to me like we were just anthologizing stuff already out there.  But as he kept talking and showing me some material, I came around … there is a TON of good writing on China and, while it is impossible to take it all in, it is important to try.  So we are going to try an experiment … every week, we’ll highlight some of the things that interest us about the news on China, adding comments where we feel we can add something or just setting it out there for you to take in.  We won’t stop the original stuff … that’s our bread and butter (and besides, its cheaper than therapy for us) … but let’s see how this goes.  Drop us a line and let us know what you think and/or clue us in to things that you think we should be paying attention to.

OK, here goes…

Living in a Bubble?

When your Chinese friends are making six figure (USD) salaries, and they say they don’t FEEL rich, even though the cost of living is almost invariably much lower in China, you know something is odd.  They feel that way because housing costs in Shanghai are 20 to 50 times annual income for the typical ($10,000/year) worker, and the better homes that rich Chinese executives want to buy are still 10 to 20 times annual income.   According to the China Daily, real estate prices rose at their fastest rate in two years in February, going up 10.7% year-on-year in 70 major cities, and undoubtedly even faster in major cities like Shanghai and Beijing.  Housing and housing-related purchases, according to the Global Times, now account for 40% of consumer spending, and have accounted for 20% of GDP since 1998.  While the government has recognized the risk that rising asset prices pose for inflation and social stability, and has signaled measures to curb the property market, some investment banks like UBS are, apparently, still bullish on Chinese property.  Needless to say, the continuing boom in housing-related purchases is great news for many foreign companies – from an IKEA, to home appliances, to decoration services, to home water purifiers.  However, we all get the feeling that “something” is out there and, at least among average people who have become “overnight millionaires” just by owning homes in Shanghai, there does seem to be the ominous feeling that values can’t keep rising.

Working for a Living

Years ago, the rallying cry for multinational participation in China was “cheap labor!!”.  Well, while labor costs in China are still much lower than North America or Western Europe, we are seeing some changes here as well.   In recent months, factory wages have risen by about 20 percent, as many migrant workers have gone home for the Chinese New Year and decided to stay home, having found better (and often less arduous) jobs in their hometowns.  According to the China Economic Review, many factories have had to lure back workers with substantial raises and that the average wage for a migrant worker in Shenzhen is now about $200/month.  Despite fears of a labor shortage at the low end, however, college graduates at the higher end are facing dimmer prospects, as detailed in pieces in both the LA Times and the New York Times.  So it seems that demand in the labor market is becoming curiously U-shaped, with factory workers getting raises and the experienced managers seeing their wages double and triple in just a few years, while recent graduates suffer on subsistence pay, even at good companies.

Gloom and Doom

Year-end predictions are lots of fun … you get to talk eloquently about what just happened (and drop a few “I-told-you-so’s” in if you can) and then go all Nostradamus and predict a gloomy future.  If you are right, kudos to you.  If you are wrong, that’s OK because it means the gloom-and-doom didn’t happen and everyone is basically happy.  This could be the case in an article in the New York Times that came out last December that highlighted the three greatest dangers that could derail the Chinese economy are inflation, protectionism, and inequality.  Let’s see how they’ve been doing so far …

• Chinese economists have been sanguine about Febuary’s 2.7 increase in the CPI, and policy shifts are unlikely in the near-term.  However, we’ve seen instances where China moves pretty quickly against inflation should the need arise so that might be the source of their comfort.
• Pressure for protectionism against China could rise, however, in light of China’s 46% export increase in February and slim chances that the government will let the RMB will appreciate.
• Growing inequality is reflected in the growing ranks of Chinese billionaires, and in a sign that the government is concerned about inequality, it recently capped the compensation of bank executives in line with similar measures in the West.

Hmmm … seems they’re doing pretty well so far, but the year is still young.  Stay tuned for more.

As we’ve been saying on this Podcast for a month or so now, China had a really good 2009.  While most of the world is thrilled to send 2009 off to the Group Home for Annoying Old Years and welcome 2010 in diapers, China is still doing victory laps for their 2009 performance, even though it was down severely from previous years.  There is a lesson to be learned here … in a room of ugly people, the average schmuck is a supermodel.  And trust me … I know how to do schmuck.

But as we all know, there is the story of what is happening in China, and then there is the truth.  Not to go all post-modern on everyone here, but the truth – if there is one Truth with a capital T – is probably somewhere in between and pundits aplenty are rushing to fill the blogosphere with their version.   For some reason, every time a talking head heaves an opinion on China into the public sphere, I have this overwhelming need to comment on it, to give the general public the beneficent view of my own brilliance and expert insight.  I know, you don’t have to tell me, I need professional help, I am fully aware of that.  I’ve tried therapy, several mood-altering substances and, as a last gasp effort, producing this Podcast, but I it hasn’t helped much.  The end-of-the-decade articles on China were killers … everywhere I looked there seemed to be an opinion popping up that absolutely REQIRED my commentary!  I consider it a mark of my immense self control and budding maturity that I was actually able to lead a somewhat normal life in the midst of all of that and did not spend all my time blogging back.  Thank you in advance for your kind words of congratulations.  I just live one day at a time.

But there is one article published way last October that I keep coming back to and, finally, cannot help but comment on.  It is by Rana Foroohar in Newsweek International is tantalizingly titled, “Everything You Know About China Is Wrong”.  The title alone compelled me to read and comment on it since, as China market strategy consultants, we go to market with what we call a “correct” view of China based on 25 years of experience so I was anxious to read it.

Ms. Foroohar elucidates several reasons why China is not the economic miracle that everyone seems to think it is.  Her opinions are not rocket science nor are they all that original … over the years there have been China-doubters aplenty who look askance at the phenomenal growth in China and wondered two things: a) is it really possible; and b) is it really sustainable??  But just because something is not original does not mean that it is not worth listening to (I give you anything recently recorded by Lady Gaga and the Jonas Brothers as proof positive of this) and I would encourage you to read her article (those of you listening to this Podcast can go to our blog for the link).  Overall, I agree with most of the statements that Ms. Foroohar makes and, in fact, I think she makes them very well; however, I would like add a couple of perspectives from the cheap-seats…

One of the myths that Ms. Foroohar attempts to deflate is “The Communists are brilliant economic managers”.  The evidence in favor of this belief is that, in 2009, China was able to maintain an 8% growth in the face of what is arguably the world’s worst economic meltdown ever.  The criticism is that this growth is driven by government investment in infrastructure and that, some day, China will have all the roads, bridges, tunnels, telecommunications networks and subways that it needs and won’t be able to make the transition to a privately-driven economy.  And it is argued that this last round of economic stimulus spending in 2009 just further deepened this problem.

This is not a new criticism and, in fact, economists, China watchers and the rabble of doomsday pundits have been making this statement since China first started their massive investment campaign in the early 90s.  For the most part, I would agree … focused investment on infrastructure is, by definition, not sustainable and, someday, China is going to have to broaden their economy to bring in other, more sustainable engines of growth.  However, I would add two caveats that would argue against being too concerned about this right now.

First of all, despite nearly 20 years of infrastructure investment, China has just scratched the surface of their total need.  China is a MASSIVE place and, while the infrastructure in the big cities of Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou is quite good, there is SO much more to be done in China’s Tier 2, 3, 4 and smaller cities (remember that China has over 100 cities with over a million population plus a seemingly endless countryside).

What I am saying is that the need for this spending – and the associated support it gives to the broader economy in terms of employment and supply infrastructure – is not going to end any time soon.  In fact, its probably going to continue strong for the next 20 years or more.  Yes, there are many associated problems with such infrastructure investment – the housing and real estate bubble is probably the most concerning – and China is going to have its ups and downs.  But this is not a small country we are talking about where you work hard for 10 years and everything is built.

My friends and colleagues in India only WISH that their government would have a similar commitment and authority to build infrastructure in their country … if they could, then I think India’s growth would quickly catch up to China’s.  But as it stands, there are so many internal politics in India that infrastructure projects often get stalled and never completed (there is a highway construction project in Chennai that I see when visiting clients there … and for over 5 years it has remained in the same state of incompletion.  There are people at the site and they look like they are doing something … but nothing seems to get done!).

Spending on infrastructure is not going to end any time soon … but the government can do something about the types of infrastructure they invest in.  The 2009 economic stimulus package of over $600 billion from the China government earmarked over $100 billion for what is called “social infrastructure” … hospitals, schools, etc. In the long run, the return on this type of infrastructural investment can be huge … and as I’ve addressed many times before in these Podcasts, China healthcare is in desperate need of life support itself and sustained investment here will do wonders.

Secondly, we need to understand – and even appreciate – the investment perspective that the China government takes in these projects.  Ms. Foroohar quotes a business professor who observed that, although there was a nice new highway built between two rural areas in China, there was no traffic on the road.

[let me just stop for a moment and ponder what it would be like to have a road somewhere in China without an immense amount of traffic on it … living in Shanghai where traffic is so bad we actually USE our fenders, that is a nice thought . OK … I am better now.  Thank you].

A couple of quick responses to this: is there infrastructure in China that is built without any thought to its eventual use – what in the U.S. has been called the “bridge to nowhere”?  Yes, definitely.  The number of pork-barrel projects here are directly proportional to the number of people schlepping the barrels … and we have nearly 5 times that number in China than they have in the U.S.  So yes, nosy business professors are going to be able to observe such examples of poor use of capital resources.

However, I think that the professor should relish in the fact that he can stand on that highway in complete safety.  Fast forward 10 years and I would venture to guess that this same professor would not be willing to stand in the middle of that road – there will be SO much traffic on it so as to turn him into a human speed bump.  In any environment, the population expands to fit the capacity provided and in China, this is doubly true.  Where I live in Shanghai, on the Pudong side, this was just rice fields a few years ago and now it is bucking to be a leading financial capital of the world.  There are putting up an 80-story building where just 20 years ago water buffalo grazed (giving a whole new meaning to the phrase “a bullish market”, I suppose).  The primary reason behind the real estate bubble here is that people are SO confident in their speculation that they are willing to bet large sums of money on property that will quote-unquote “some day” actually be worth more than the exorbitant price they just paid for it.  Oh, that and the fact that much of the real estate investment is being driven by people not using their own money but the government’s … but that is an issue for another Podcast.

So we should not be asking the question: “Is China’s spending on infrastructure sustainable in the long term” because it is, by definition, NOT sustainable.  Of course it isn’t.  We should, on the other hand, be asking the more difficult-to-answer question “what do you mean by ‘long term’”?  We are only 20 years into a modern business environment in China, and look how far we’ve come.  Of course, you don’t drive well by admiring the view in your rearview mirror (although that might explain some of the traffic problem here) so we need to look ahead.  My point is that, barring disasters of all types, China’s near to mid term looks pretty good and very sustainable.

Of course, there is a LOT that I do not understand about macro-economics and I am sure that I will get nasty letters from the Association of Super Smart Economists of just how wrong I am.  But to be honest, how accurate are those Super Smart Economists?  They are working off of models developed in other economies in other cultures at other times and have been woefully inaccurate in predicting even the things they supposedly understand well (ala the mortgage crisis).  The fact remains that we don’t have ANY case studies to guide us as to what might happen here in China … there has never been a country in history that is this large and has made this big of an investment in their infrastructure and government spending.  The U.S. and Japan are in the same direction, but they did theirs at very different times in history when the world was a VERY different place.  Yes, China will eventually have to pull out of this model … it cannot continue forever.  But we don’t have any good examples of a situation of this scale where this has happened.  As I have said before, in China, we are working without a script AND we are working without a net!

Twenty five years ago, when I first came to China, if someone were to show me a picture of what Shanghai would look like in 2010, I’d think they were smoking something.  NO ONE could have – or would have – predicted this.  Indeed, there were multiple doomsday preachers talking about the immanent collapse of “Red China” (I love that term, Red China … like it’s a theme color for the day!).  But here we are, still technically “Red” but, so far, no collapse.  Could it happen?  You bet.  But I assume that the only completely untrue statement is “I am 100% right” so it could also not happen.  And I am betting on the latter.

Thanks again for listening.  Remember our motto: “In China, everything is possible but nothing is easy.”  We’ll see you next time on the China Business Podcast

Those who have been doing business in China for awhile are quite familiar with the differences between the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the Privately-Owned Enterprises (POEs).  For those of you not familiar with this distinction, let me break it down for you.  The POEs are just that, companies owned privately with little or no government involvement – they are often run by business-savvy executives with global business experience.  The SOEs, to put it succinctly, are seen as hulking, unprofitable behemoths chocked full of aging assets and run by 55 year old Party hacks in moth-eaten Mao suits and greasy comb-overs.  OK … maybe I am being a bit too hard on them, but the term “SOE” has been used as a pejorative descriptor more often that not.

After Liberation in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party brought all businesses under their control and POEs were, for all intents and purposes, completely eliminated in China (as was nearly all foreign investment when they were unceremoniously kicked out of China).  Through a series of disastrous events in the 50s through the 70s (the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, etc.), the government proved that, not unlike their Soviet cousins, they were terrible CEOs – factories were inefficient, poorly run and churned out bad-quality junk that had no relationship to any market demands whatsoever.  That wasn’t as bad as it seemed because China retail and commercial trade was not yet standardized so bad products were also hard to purchase.  Go figure.

One of the many reforms that the Deng Xiao-ping administration started in the early 80s was captured under the Party phrase 民进国退 (min2 jin4 guo3 tui4): “POEs will advance; SOEs will retreat.”  What this meant, in effect, was that the Party wanted to get out of the business of being in business and started the long, mind-numbing, ulcer-inducing process of unwinding the complicated SOE culture … which included, for many people, guaranteed housing, education and healthcare.

Fast forward to the mid-2000s and you begin to see private Chinese companies really moving the market.  Thanks to China’s joining the WTO in the early part of this century, various sectors in the China market were opened to foreign investment, particularly retail and distribution/logistics.  This led to further (and more rapid) modernization of China’s business environment and it looked as if the SOEs were going to go the way of the dinosaur, only to be studied by business anthropologists who dug up their jerry-rigged balance sheets and padded expense accounts.

But don’t count the SOEs down for good … we see that there might be life in these old war horses yet, in part because the Chinese government and the Party (one in the same thing here) sees some advantages to keeping their fingers in the business world, particularly in areas that have remained the jurisdiction of the government such as automotive, oil & gas, media, etc.  Not to over-simplify things but these SOEs have two unique competitive advantages over their foreign competitors: first, the SOEs are not held to strict growth and profitability metrics and are encouraged by the State to get as big as possible, regardless of margin targets; and second, the government makes available an almost unlimited stock of growth capital through forced lending from the State-controlled banks.  Imagine if you, as a business executive, were told by your shareholders, “OK … here is the deal – we want you to grow this company.  Don’t worry about profits, just bring in the revenue … we have ways of dealing with the P&L.  And when you need money, just ask.  We’ve got plenty.”  Sounds like a dream scenario, right?

Well, it seems to be working and we are seeing a surge in some of these SOEs – in automotive, the so-called “Big Four” (First Auto Works, Shanghai Automotive, Dongfeng and Changan) are on a consolidation tear, encouraged by the government to acquire smaller, regional automotive companies, much like GM, Chrysler and Ford did in the early days of the U.S. auto industry.  The Chinese oil, gas and mining giants are actively looking outside of China for investment and, though they have been rebuffed by some foreign governments, are slowing expanding their global footprint.  Several of the larger SOE construction equipment companies are aggressively expanding, both inside and outside of China (as a side note, some say that this is why Carlyle’s acquisition attempt of construction giant XCMG did not go through last year … that the government wanted to maintain control in what they saw as a very strategic industry).  All of these SOEs – and many more besides – benefit from very easy capital lending requirements from State-run banks.

A recent article in the New York Times highlighted the pressures that Chinese banks are under to insure that they keep their lending capital accounts well-stocked and rumors are flying around China that the government is requiring China banks to raise their capital adequacy ratios.  Some might see this as a slowing down of lending.  However, I interpret it as just the opposite: the government wants the Chinese banks to keep good reserves of dry powder to be able to lend to those, predominantly, SOE companies that need growth capital.  It’s a “go slow to go fast” strategy if there ever was one.

All of this has led to private chats over dinners and drinks all over China that the government is trying to reverse their dictum of the 80s and say, rather, 国进民退 (guo3 jin4 min2 tui4): “SOEs will advance and POEs will retreat.”  While I seriously doubt we will ever see this in an official government document, the government’s practices are certainly encouraging this.  The SOEs are no longer run by Party hacks … their CEOs are often Western-business educated and understand very well both international commerce and the unique requirements of doing business in China.  They are dressed in Armani suits, have their hair styled and show up at the right parties, all the while maintaining their status in the Party-with-a-capital-P!

Just this past year, we’ve been involved in more competitive intelligence programs with our clients, helping them understand the ever-changing landscape around them.   It used to be that they were just interested in understanding their foreign competitors; however, more and more we see Chinese companies – and particularly SOEs – coming to the forefront of our clients’ concerns.  And given the competitive advantages these SOEs bring with them, everyone is very smart to be concerned about them.

So the question you need to answer is this – do you know your SOE competition?  Do you know who is backing them?  Who is running them?  Do you know what their growth strategies are and what their plans are to grow in the market?  Do you know what they think of you?!?  I can almost guarantee that they are no longer the lazy competitors you once knew.  You better understand them because they are a big threat, whether you know it or not.