SOEs in China today – Not your Grandfather’s State Owned Enterprises any more!
Thursday, November 26th, 2009Download this podcast
Length – 6:43
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Those who have been doing business in China for awhile are quite familiar with the differences between the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the Privately-Owned Enterprises (POEs). For those of you not familiar with this distinction, let me break it down for you. The POEs are just that, companies owned privately with little or no government involvement – they are often run by business-savvy executives with global business experience. The SOEs, to put it succinctly, are seen as hulking, unprofitable behemoths chocked full of aging assets and run by 55 year old Party hacks in moth-eaten Mao suits and greasy comb-overs. OK … maybe I am being a bit too hard on them, but the term “SOE” has been used as a pejorative descriptor more often that not.
After Liberation in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party brought all businesses under their control and POEs were, for all intents and purposes, completely eliminated in China (as was nearly all foreign investment when they were unceremoniously kicked out of China). Through a series of disastrous events in the 50s through the 70s (the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, etc.), the government proved that, not unlike their Soviet cousins, they were terrible CEOs – factories were inefficient, poorly run and churned out bad-quality junk that had no relationship to any market demands whatsoever. That wasn’t as bad as it seemed because China retail and commercial trade was not yet standardized so bad products were also hard to purchase. Go figure.
One of the many reforms that the Deng Xiao-ping administration started in the early 80s was captured under the Party phrase 民进国退 (min2 jin4 guo3 tui4): “POEs will advance; SOEs will retreat.” What this meant, in effect, was that the Party wanted to get out of the business of being in business and started the long, mind-numbing, ulcer-inducing process of unwinding the complicated SOE culture … which included, for many people, guaranteed housing, education and healthcare.
Fast forward to the mid-2000s and you begin to see private Chinese companies really moving the market. Thanks to China’s joining the WTO in the early part of this century, various sectors in the China market were opened to foreign investment, particularly retail and distribution/logistics. This led to further (and more rapid) modernization of China’s business environment and it looked as if the SOEs were going to go the way of the dinosaur, only to be studied by business anthropologists who dug up their jerry-rigged balance sheets and padded expense accounts.
But don’t count the SOEs down for good … we see that there might be life in these old war horses yet, in part because the Chinese government and the Party (one in the same thing here) sees some advantages to keeping their fingers in the business world, particularly in areas that have remained the jurisdiction of the government such as automotive, oil & gas, media, etc. Not to over-simplify things but these SOEs have two unique competitive advantages over their foreign competitors: first, the SOEs are not held to strict growth and profitability metrics and are encouraged by the State to get as big as possible, regardless of margin targets; and second, the government makes available an almost unlimited stock of growth capital through forced lending from the State-controlled banks. Imagine if you, as a business executive, were told by your shareholders, “OK … here is the deal – we want you to grow this company. Don’t worry about profits, just bring in the revenue … we have ways of dealing with the P&L. And when you need money, just ask. We’ve got plenty.” Sounds like a dream scenario, right?
Well, it seems to be working and we are seeing a surge in some of these SOEs – in automotive, the so-called “Big Four” (First Auto Works, Shanghai Automotive, Dongfeng and Changan) are on a consolidation tear, encouraged by the government to acquire smaller, regional automotive companies, much like GM, Chrysler and Ford did in the early days of the U.S. auto industry. The Chinese oil, gas and mining giants are actively looking outside of China for investment and, though they have been rebuffed by some foreign governments, are slowing expanding their global footprint. Several of the larger SOE construction equipment companies are aggressively expanding, both inside and outside of China (as a side note, some say that this is why Carlyle’s acquisition attempt of construction giant XCMG did not go through last year … that the government wanted to maintain control in what they saw as a very strategic industry). All of these SOEs – and many more besides – benefit from very easy capital lending requirements from State-run banks.
A recent article in the New York Times highlighted the pressures that Chinese banks are under to insure that they keep their lending capital accounts well-stocked and rumors are flying around China that the government is requiring China banks to raise their capital adequacy ratios. Some might see this as a slowing down of lending. However, I interpret it as just the opposite: the government wants the Chinese banks to keep good reserves of dry powder to be able to lend to those, predominantly, SOE companies that need growth capital. It’s a “go slow to go fast” strategy if there ever was one.
All of this has led to private chats over dinners and drinks all over China that the government is trying to reverse their dictum of the 80s and say, rather, 国进民退 (guo3 jin4 min2 tui4): “SOEs will advance and POEs will retreat.” While I seriously doubt we will ever see this in an official government document, the government’s practices are certainly encouraging this. The SOEs are no longer run by Party hacks … their CEOs are often Western-business educated and understand very well both international commerce and the unique requirements of doing business in China. They are dressed in Armani suits, have their hair styled and show up at the right parties, all the while maintaining their status in the Party-with-a-capital-P!
Just this past year, we’ve been involved in more competitive intelligence programs with our clients, helping them understand the ever-changing landscape around them. It used to be that they were just interested in understanding their foreign competitors; however, more and more we see Chinese companies – and particularly SOEs – coming to the forefront of our clients’ concerns. And given the competitive advantages these SOEs bring with them, everyone is very smart to be concerned about them.
So the question you need to answer is this – do you know your SOE competition? Do you know who is backing them? Who is running them? Do you know what their growth strategies are and what their plans are to grow in the market? Do you know what they think of you?!? I can almost guarantee that they are no longer the lazy competitors you once knew. You better understand them because they are a big threat, whether you know it or not.

Mary Teagarden, Ph.D., is professor of global strategy at